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Opening Remarks by the Director of Training
1954 Agency Orientation Course No. 2

4 May 1954

Fellow members of the Central Intelligence Agency and members of the intelligence community, the Fourteenth Agency Orientation Course is in session. This is a training program conducted by the Office of Training that is assisted and participated in by officers both from in the Agency and outside the Agency. The purpose of the program as all training programs in the Agency is to increase the production and efficiency of the intelligence family, by adding to the effectiveness of the individual in his present or projected assignment. I usually follow that statement with a rather pat and somewhat pompous restatement that the purpose of this course or the purposes and I usually get in a plug for training in general. I'm going to depart from that customary procedure this morning to tell you about a conversation coming down here today and ask you 500 odd of the Central Intelligence Agency to put your minds to work on the problem. Last January one of the ablest of our junior officer trainees, OCS members came back from his tour of duty with the Army. He had been at Fort Knox where he took his basic training, Fort Benning where he took his officer candidate training and spent 6 months, no I think it was 9 months on a regular tour of duty with an Army T and O unit and then had come back to the Agency in January to serve out the remainder of his commitment with the Army as a regular assigned member of the Agency under the military quota. When he came back in January he reported to my office and I have seldom seen a young man who was more fired with the enthusiasm of what he had done and with the enthusiasm of what he expected to do in the service of his government. He had enjoyed, he had profited by his experience in the Army. He was fired up with the

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desire to do as good a job in the Central Intelligence Agency. He was assigned to an office. I hadn't seen him until this morning. We met as we were about to congregate at one of the places for the busses to pick us up. I suggested that it was a brisk morning, unlike yesterday, and that we walk to the Department of Agriculture Auditorium. I said, [REDACTED] ^{25X1A9a} you don't seem to indicate to me the same feeling of enthusiasm that I thought I detected on your face in January. He answered noncommittally and I said, "What's the matter?" His explanation was difficult, just as difficult as it is for me to give you the impression I am attempting to. He said, "I think I miss the team play." He said, "I think I miss the enthusiasm, the feeling of unity, the feeling of working together toward a common and understood goal that I felt in the Army. I feel somewhat like an outsider here. I don't know what I'm expected to do. I'm not sure of the mission and function of my branch. I don't feel that I'm as essential to the defense effort of my country as I did when I was a Second Lieutenant in the Army." I said, "What is it you miss-- the flag waving that you got in the Army." "No, I don't think I miss that." He said, "I just wonder why it is that I get the impression that people in CIA are rather ashamed to express their belief in their own job."

Now there is more to it than that. I don't think that I could make the position any clearer, however. I think I told you enough for you to recognize either something that has happened to you or that's happened to somebody you know in CIA. I bring it to your attention because I think that what is taking place, the spectacle that is taking place in Washington now, and that which is taking place across the Atlantic should indicate to us, all of us, the need for loyalty and pride in our outfit. And I think we do too little in CIA to nurture that loyalty and pride in our outfit. I think we are all loyal to our

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section, sometimes to our branch, less often to our division, and unhappily not often enough to the total effort of CIA. The reason being that we know too little about the total effort of CIA. We run smack dab into the question of the "Need to know."

We've never put on a training program of any kind that the Office of Security isn't invited to participate in in an important position. I will be followed on this program by Col. Edwards but I want to state now because Col. Edwards doesn't come till the last day that I am one of the firmest believers in the principle of the "Need to know." All that I want to raise in your minds today is that we do not abuse the "Need to know" principle. I don't mean the abuse which takes you or finds you directed to go to the Security Office. I mean the abuse which comes from not telling our people what they should know so that their job in CIA is more meaningful, so that the total effort in CIA is more meaningful, so that the total product of the intelligence community is more meaningful. The abuse of the "Need to know" principle that I'm talking about is that too often people who should know the mission and function of their own job don't know it clearly and, therefore, can't give the policy guidance to their subordinates and they fall back on the "Need to know" principle by saying, "That is none of your business, you do not need to know the answer to the question that you've asked me." Or the abuse which says, "There is no reason why you should know about the DD/I activities because you aren't in the DD/I activities." I think that is an abuse of the principles of "Need to know." The abuse ends up in, perhaps, a greater security but certainly a lower morale among the thousands of people who work for CIA. This course, on analysis, would seem to conflict with the "Need to know" principle. You who are here from all parts of the Agency are going to learn this week about the activities of all parts of the Agency, and I believe that it is a worthwhile gamble with

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the "Need to know" principle because I expect that your morale will be increased and your pride in the total effort of CIA will be enhanced.

Too often, we as individuals know about the failures in our own immediate activity and, therefore, are prone to judge the total activity of CIA in light of those failures. Those of us who are perhaps a little closer in the table of organization to Mr. Dulles know that that is a faulty picture, but the total effort of CIA is one which we can all be proud of, and I am sure that that will be attested to by the other members, fellow members of the intelligence community that are here today and who are not members of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The purpose then of this course and these remarks is to ask you to bring your intelligence to bear on this problem of how we can accept the principle of "Need to know" and at the same time not abuse it, keeping in mind the importance today, as never before, of a unified and loyal body.

I think it all can be summed up in the words that you will find in the program which you may not have come across yet which is a quotation from the Jackson Committee Report:

"... better efficiency and morale in the ranks of the public service will, in our view, depend upon new efforts to improve training programs for those entering into the field of National Security affairs, so as to provide not only greater technical competence and language and area knowledge, but also a broader understanding of the significance of their own assignment."

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